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Introduction 
In this paper I wish to examine the relationship between security of tenure and 
its effects on agricultural investment. I will be drawing on data from the 1882 
Royal Commission in an attempt to provide quantitative evidence where there 
has previously been only speculation. I will begin by setting the scene and 
explaining how the controversy arises . 
Chapter 1 
Tenancy and fanning methods in the late nineteenth century 
In his paper "The Second Agricultural Revolution 1815-1880" F.M.L. 
Thompson advances the "proposition that there was not one single agricultural 
revolution but three, of which the second fell in the period 1815-1880."1 He 
argues that the farm of the first revolution was basically a closed unit. The 
only regular input to the farm was seed and at the end of each season the farm 
would have produced some corn, meat and wool for sale at market. The 
farmer also operated an internal market for his goods . Each year he produced 
roots and clover that put the nitrogen back into the soil . He also grew food for 
his animals that powered the farm, provided meat and dairy products and 
valuable manure. 
The farmer of the second agricultural revolution behaved more like a factory 
owner who purchased raw materials and used the farm to convert them into 
higher value goods. The farmer began buying manure and fertiliser and was 
less dependent on rotation crops for improving the quality of the soil. He also 
began buying feed for his livestock which freed some of his land for more 
IF.M.L. Thompson, 'The Second Agricultural Revolution, 1815-1880', Economic 
History Review,_XXI, (1968) , p63 
profitable use and yet still gave him the valuable by-product - manure. 
The third revolution involved the increased use of machinery and the heavy use 
of fertilisers. 
This change towards the second agricultural revolution began with the increased 
use of bones as a fertiliser and oilseed cake as animal feed. Oilseed, such as 
linseed and rape seed was valued for its oil by both textiles and paint 
manufacturers . The oilseed cake was a by-product of this industry; it was what 
was left after the oil had been extracted from the seeds. The cake began the 
nineteenth century as a waste product used as cheap fuel and fertiliser until it 
became apparent that it made a very good animal feed. It had been claimed 
that there was no limit to the amount of cake that was profitable to feed cattle 
because oilseed manure was valued so highly . 2 
Demands on Capital 
The change to a more intense system of farming gave higher yields but also 
required more capital from both the landlord and the tenant. The landlord 
needed to provide capital in the form of increased drainage and outbuildings 
to house both livestock and the stock of feed and fertiliser . However, an 
increasing proportion of the capital came from the tenant for the inputs to the 
farm amounting to a "substantial rise in the amount of tenant farmers ' working 
capital. " 3 
R. Perren, in his essay "The Landlord and Agricultural Transformation 1870-
1900" said he saw increasing availability of oil cake from Europe and rising 
animal product prices as the key factors encouraging the production of 
2Thompson, 'Second Agricultural Revolution', p68 
~ompson, 'Second Agricultural Revolution' , p65 
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livestock. Like Thompson, he believed that the more intensive farming 
required increased capital both from the tenant farmer and the landlord. The 
tenant needed more capital to buy in livestock and also for feedstuffs. 4 This 
was particularly true if the farmer practised stall or yard feeding where the 
proportion of feedstuffs in the diet was greatly increased. 
For the farmer to make the transition to a 'commercialised' farm it was 
necessary to make some considerable investment. The more intensive farming 
was profitable because it gave higher output from the existing quantities of 
land. However, the investment in livestock, animal feed and fertiliser would 
last a number of years, for example, bones ploughed into the soil were said to 
last five years. Thompson estimates that between 1820-1880 tenants working 
capital rose by £50m or approximately £3 per acre. Even for a small farmer 
this investment is well over one year's income. Fortunately the transition from 
a closed circuit to a open circuit farm can be a smooth one where the total 
inputs purchased each year gradually rises as capital is accumulated. 
Problem of Security 
The problem was that the farmer had to be sure that he would reap the rewards 
of his investment. Even though the return on fertiliser and feed was a 
relatively short process, security of tenure was essential if the farmer was to 
invest in his land. According to Chambers and Mingay, this was a problem 
that was fully appreciated by agricultural writers as far back as 1774 when a 
long lease of 14 or 21 years was considered a good solution.s Chambers and 
Mingay also suggested that landlords may have helped farmers succeed "by the 
4R. Perren, 'The Landlord and Agricultural Transformation 1870-1900', in P.I . 
Perry, (ed), 'British Agriculture 1875-1914' , pllO 
sI.D. Chambers and G.E. Mingay, 'The Agricultural Revolution 1750-1880', 
p46 
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provision of long leases"6 Not all farmers had the security of a long lease but 
it seems obvious that farmers would be more likely to make improvements to 
their land if they felt certain of reaping advantage from them.7 In a more 
recent debate between owner occupancy and tenant farming it was agreed that 
having longer leases would help remove the risk from tenants' investments: -
"granting longer leases and ensuring compensation for unexhausted 
improvement would greatly mitigate the effects of uncertainty on tenants' 
investment decisions . "8 
Existence of Yearly Agreements 
If leases were so good at removing risk from tenants' investments then we 
might expect all landlord tenant contracts to be long leases . This was not the 
case. The tripartite system had the tenant farmer as the main agent employing 
labourers and paying rent to the landlord. Prior to the second agricultural 
revolution it had worked well . When the tenant farmer fell on bad times, he 
would look to the landlord to reduce the rent and so many farmers were saved 
from financial ruin and the landlord was spared the inconvenience of finding 
a new tenant. In times of general depression rents fell across the country. 
This was done to maintain existing tenants and to attract new tenants to vacant 
farms . In hard times, it was not unheard-of for landlords to charge no rent at 
all because by keeping a farmer on the land the soil would be kept in good 
condition.9 The landowner appreciated that his rents would need to fluctuate 
with the price of agricultural produce and the prosperity of his tenants . To 
6Ibid., p16 
7Ibid. , p165 
8R. Gasson and B. Hill, 'Farm Tenure and Peiformance' ,(1984), p17 
9J. T. Coppock, ' Agricultural Changes in the Chilterns 1875-1900', in P .J . 
Perry (ed), 'British Agriculture 1875-1914' , p62 
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enable the regular review of rents, short contracts were favoured and these 
normally gave the tenant six months notice to quit. These short contracts were 
known as yearly agreements or tenancy from year to year. With only six 
months notice to quit the farmers did not have much security and we might 
expect these tenants to invest less than the lease holders . Investment in feed 
lasted at least one year, Thompson suggests that it would last at least two years. 
This is because the feed is consumed by livestock that might not be ready for 
market for another year or two. There are also secondary effects; the feed is 
converted into manure which would not be exhausted by the soil for some 
years. Some farmers valued oilseed manure more highly than the oilseed 
itself. 10 Fertilisers such as bones and superphosphate would last about five 
years so it is obvious that yearly agreements might lead to lower investment 
than lease holding. 
Development of Tenant Right 
The main argument against this hypothesis is the existence of something called 
the 'Lincolnshire tenant-right.' Having only light soil, Lincolnshire farmers 
were some of the first to use large quantities of fertiliser on a regular basis . 
The rapid growth of agricultural output between 1835-1850 was mainly due to 
an increased use of bones, which were ploughed into the soil, supplying 
nitrogen and phosphates which enabled light soils to yield heavy crops. The 
problem was that the effects of the bones lasted up to five years and so the 
people of Lincolnshire developed the tenant-right which was "a set of 
customary rules for compensating outgoing tenants for their unexhausted 
improvements. " 11 
lonompson, 'Second Agricultural Revolution', p68 
lllbid., p68 
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The idea was that the tenant made an arrangement with his landlord to be 
compensated for any improvement he left behind. These agreements were 
supposed to remove the risk from investing in the land. 
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Chapter 2 
Interpretations 
A number of economic historians have put forward strong arguments to suggest 
that there were no problems with these tenancy arrangements. Firstly, they 
argue that tenant right covered any lack of security inherent in short contracts. 
Secondly, they observe that tenants with yearly agreements often resided on the 
same farm for many generations and thus expected to be resident for a number 
of years to come. Finally, it is argued that tenant farmers were free agents and 
if they felt that security of tenure was a problem they could negotiate a lease 
with their landlord. 
Among those arguing in this direction are: 6 Gnida, Thompson and Chambers 
and Mingay. 6 Grada says that lack of security did not stop farmers from 
improving their holdings because of the "widespread" systems of tenant right 
and the fact that farms often remained within a family for many years. He 
suggests that tenants who were concerned with the lack of security could have 
negotiated special terms in their contracts . He says that no evidence has ever 
been put forward to demonstrate a correlation between security and tenants 
outlay, and that replies to the Royal Commission of 1882 "imply" that those 
farmers without tenant right invested no less in lime and fertiliser than those 
with tenant right. 12 
12C. 6 Grada, 'Agricultural Decline, 1860-1914', in R. Floud and D. 
McCloskey,(eds.), 'Economic History in Britain since 1700', Vol. IT, pI87 
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Thompson felt that the infonnal institutional arrangements were sufficient and 
that the spread of compensation by tenant right meant that fanners were not 
discouraged from • enterprise" . 13 
Chambers and Mingay seem to have an idyllic view of rural England. They 
write, that tenant fanners who held their land on yearly agreements trusted their 
landlord and seldom felt insecure. Their belief is based on a kind of 
gentleman's agreement that if you proved to be a good tenant then the landlord 
would leave you in possession of the land. As evidence for this they say that 
tenants often occupied the land for long periods and it was not uncommon for 
them to invest in improvements .14 However, later in the same book, 
Chambers and Mingay agree that greater security of tenure and compensation 
for unexhausted improvements would have encouraged better farming. IS 
Tenant Right 
The first argument was that tenant right covered any lack of security. 
However, by their nature tenant right agreements were informal and depended 
on the fanner's trust in their landlord. Only a quantitative study can tell us 
how much security they really offered. 6 Grada says himself that fanners 
without tenant right did not spend less on lime and fertiliser than those who had 
tenant right - therefore, conversely, having tenant right did not increase 
investment. Perhaps we might find that tenant right increased security but not 
by as much as a long lease. 
13Thompson, 'Second Agricultural Revolution', p72 
14J.D. Chambers and G.E. Mingay, 'The Agricultural Revolution 1750-1880', 
p46 
ISlbid., p164 
8 
Secondly, those who have said that tenant right mitigated the problem of 
insecurity by becoming popular and widespread are forgetting that not all 
tenants were covered. Even if tenant right was removing the risks from 
investment, the benefits did not accrue to all farmers and as such these 
arrangements were not satisfactory. Security of tenure was one of the issues 
studied in the Royal Commission 1882, the background to which I will discuss 
later in the text. This is what the Assistant Commissioner found in his study 
of Southern County farms . He found that tenants security was heavily 
dependant on the honesty of the landlord. 16 In some regions the custom of 
tenant right was relatively rare and he felt that few landlord-tenant agreements 
recognised the tenant's investment in manure and feedstuffs. 17 Security of 
tenure was even a problem for the lease holder. Little believed that towards 
the end of his lease the farmer would have "little inducement" to manage the 
farm properly or to spend much time on the hay crop which would almost 
certainly be left behind if the lease was not renewed and the farmer left.l& He 
felt that this was a common problem and that there were a "great number of 
farms· without the security that would encourage good farming towards the end 
of their leases .19 
"A farmer occupying 600 acre under 14 years' lease, writes thus: 
'Tenant-right? I have none, it's all on the landlord's side. My lease 
gives me no allowance for permanent improvement. . .. I don't get a 
single penny, but I am bound by my lease to manure and crop and sow 
16Parliamentary Papers (here after called B.P.P .) 1882, XVI, p7 
17Ibid., p8 
18Ibid., p8 
l~id., p8 
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seeds for the incomer free of cost to him' ... [Little writes] of this I am 
well convinced, that a lease such as he holds under cannot encourage 
him to farm well at the latter part of his term. 020 
Much of Commissioner Little's evidence is of this nature but it illustrates that 
not every farmer was happy with the situation as it was. 
Length of Occupancy 
The second argument was that long occupancy fostered trust in the landlord. 
This assumes that because a tenant has had the same landlord for years, he 
trusts him and feels certain about the future. However, this ignores the 
changes in the bargaining position brought about by an investment in the land. 
The farmer realises that when it comes to bargaining over next year's contract 
he will be in a worse position if the landlord knows that he has just invested a 
lot of money in fertiliser and feed . The farmer is open to exploitation by his 
landlord who can raise the rent by the amount equal to the farmer's expected 
loss if he is forced to leave. In such a situation the farmer would be indifferent 
to whether he should leave or stay and he would lose his investment in rent to 
the landlord. This scenario does not actually have to take place, all that is 
necessary is that the farmer realises that he is open to exploitation by the 
landlord and therefore does not make what would otherwise be a profitable 
investment. 
A more subtle approach by the landlord would be to appropriate some of the 
gains from the investment and not frighten the farmer by stealing his stake. 
For example; in year one the tenant farmer invests £100 in fertiliser and feed 
which pays for itself in year two by increasing output by £110 after which we 
2OIbid., pl9 
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assume the benefits are exhausted. This would amount to a ten percent return 
on working capital. The landlord could raise the rent in year two by £110 and 
appropriate the tenant's investment and return. The farmer would then be 
indifferent between staying or leaving, but he certainly won't invest in feed and 
fertiliser again. The alternative for the landlord would be to increase the rent 
in year two by perhaps £5. The farmer's return on investment then falls to five 
percent and as long as his return remains positive (above his cost of capital) he 
will continue to invest in subsequent years. The problem is that the landlord 
reduces the return on investment at all levels and this will result in investment 
below the social optimum. 
The actual outcome was probably some combination of strategies with some 
landlords discouraging all investment, some appropriating some of the benefits 
of higher investment and others not even charging realistic rents. The problem 
would not be so acute for those farmers who had tenant right. If the landlord 
tried to appropriate their investment they could leave and have their 
compensation for unexhausted improvements . However, this does not stop the 
landlord from appropriating some of the benefits of the investment. If, 
however, 6 Gnida's theory is true, we would expect to find a correlation 
between length of occupancy and investment; the hypothesis being that long 
occupancy leads to security about the future and trust in the landlord and hence 
a more optimal rate of investment. 
Product Prices 
Finally, the third argument was that if tenants were free agents they could 
negotiate their own contracts. If security of tenure was such a problem then 
why were leases not the dominant form of contract? The reason for taking out 
a long contract was to fix the rent and remove any possibility for opportunism 
11 
by the landlord . This had to be weighed against the advantages of a variable 
rent that could fall when times were hard and rise when times were good. This 
was valuable to both parties and removed many of the problems caused by 
changing product prices. The farmer who took a long lease was taking a risk 
on changing product prices which he did for the expected enhanced profits from 
his increased investment security. Whether or not the farmer chooses to take 
a lease will depend on his assessment of the two risks, investment and product 
price, and whether he wants to trade one for the other. We can see evidence 
for this if we compare the popularity of leases with farmers expectations of 
future prices. In his book "English Landed Society" F.M.L. Thompson notes 
how the popularity ofleases declined after the Napoleonic wars and he says that 
tenants would not commit themselves all the while prices were falling. 
Apparently, it was almost impossible to find a tenant ready to take a lease and 
yet twenty years earlier most farmers had been trying to do so.21 Thompson 
believes that the popularity of leases declined after the war and failed to recover 
for the rest of the century.22 Mingay agrees and suggests that leases lost their 
popularity during the nineteenth century due to the "severe price fluctuations 
and periods of depression. 0123 
Political Pressure 
Finally, there were some contemporary commentators who believed that 
landlords were not granting leases for political reasons . Among these was 
Cobden, a campaigner against the Com Laws. He believed that landlords 
21F.M.L. Thompson, 'English Landed Society in the Nineteenth Century', p230 
22lbid., p231 
23G . Mingay, 'The Agricultural Revolution in English History: A 
Reconsideration' , in W.E. Minchinton, (ed), 'Essays in Agrarian History', Vol. 
n, p16 
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refused to grant leases because the subsequent lack of security would force the 
farmers to vote with the landlords and thus retain the Corn Laws. According 
to Chambers and Mingay, this was an argument that was heard frequently 
during the nineteenth century.24 Although this might be true it seems unlikely 
that it was of much importance in the latter half of the century when tenants 
were probably more reluctant to take on a lease than their landlords. 
Current Economic Literature 
There is a substantial body of literature on a subject known as transactions cost 
theory and contract design. In general the literature looks at the development 
of different contractual arrangements as a response to potential opportunistic 
behaviour by one party in a relationship. These contractual problems arise 
when a rational and opportunistic firm has an incentive to take advantage of a 
supplier who makes a transaction specific investment. 
The example commonly used to illustrate the situation is that of a publisher and 
a printer. The publisher approaches the printer and arranges to print a regular 
newspaper in Greek. The printer makes a 'relationship specific investment' in 
a Greek printing press and then begins working for the publisher. However, 
a gap now exists between the value of the press in its first best use and its value 
to the next highest valuing leasee. That is to say that if the publisher decided 
to change to a different supplier the printer is left with an asset that is worth 
substantially less . He will have to pay to have it removed and perhaps shipped 
to a second hand buyer in Greece. Alternatively, he could try and find a new 
buyer for his services. This gap between first best use (i.e. selling his services 
to the publisher) and second best use (finding a new buyer or scrapping the 
24J.D. Chambers and G.E. Mingay, 'The Agricultural Revolution 1750-1880', 
pl60 
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press) is called the quasi-rent. Knowing the printer's dilemma, the publisher 
can now offer a lower price for the services of the printing press and 
appropriate this quasi-rent.2.S If this problem is appreciated in advance then the 
specific nature of the asset could cause the printer not to invest in the press. 
These kinds of problems are common when relationship specific investments 
are concerned and where contractual solutions can not be found they tend to 
lead to less than optimal investment.26 For evidence of this Klien, Crawford 
and Alchian look to the motor industry.27 Where competitive contracting still 
leaves appropriable rents they find that the supplier and the motor manufacturer 
tend to vertically integrate which internalises the quasi-rent. I believe that 
relationship between the nineteenth-century landlord and tenant is analogous; 
the tenant being open to opportunistic behaviour by the landlord and the quasi-
rent is the investment in the land. This investment is relationship specific and 
its scrap value is zero if the landlord chooses to evict the tenant. The solution 
used in the motor industry was vertical integration of the supplier and the 
manufacturer. In this case, the analogous solution would be to integrate the 
landlord and tenant and create an owner occupier where the quasi-rent is 
internalised. 
2.SK. Monteverde and D. Teece, 'Appropriable Rents and Quasi-Vertical 
Integration', Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. XXV, (Oct. 1982), p323 
26J. Tirole, 'The Theory of Industrial Organisation', (1990), p25 
27B. Klein, R. Crawford, and A. Alchian, 'Vertical Integration, Appropriable 
Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process', Journal of Law and 
Economics, (Oct. 1978) 
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However, Monteverde and Teece find another solution to the problem of asset 
specificity, by looking at the motor industry.la The solution here is something 
they call quasi-vertical integration. Motor manufacturers make sure that they 
own all the specialised equipment their suppliers use to make their components. 
Thus, if the suppliers tried to hold the manufacturers to ransom they could 
move the specialised equipment to new suppliers and avoid long delays. The 
objective is to minimise supplier switching costs . A similar solution could be 
applied to the tenant farmer problem although it is unclear which party is the 
supplier or manufacturer. The landlord would be required to pay for all feed 
and fertiliser at the beginning of the year and then the two parties would 
negotiate the rent. The farmer would have minimised the costs of switching to 
other suppliers of land. This would remove the possibility for opportunism and 
the two parties would negotiate a fair rent. This would result in optimal 
investment but might be a little inflexible. 
Finally, Paul Ioskow studied the relationship between contract duration and 
transaction specific investments in coal markets.29 He found that long contracts 
are used in coal markets as a response to problems created by asset specificity. 
In particular, where power stations and coal mines are next to one another and 
interdependent they have long contracts, whereas, power stations that depend 
on a number of different mines tend to have shorter contracts. Obviously, in 
this situation, holders of long leases have greater security over their 
investments . Was this the case with tenant farmers? 
28Monteverde and Teece, 'Appropriable Rents and Quasi-Vertical Integration' 
29p. Ioskow, 'Contract Duration and Durable Transaction Specific Investments: 
The Case of Coal', American Economic Review, 77 (March 1987), p168-185 
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Summary 
Thompson and 6 Gclda have other arguments that I will discuss later. 
However, their basic premise is that tenancy arrangements did not affect 
agricultural techniques and it is this hypothesis that I wish to examine. Of 
particular interest is whether having a lease led to greater annual consumption 
of feedstuff and fertiliser and hence investment. Also, were allowances for 
tenant right any substitute for a secure lease? One can also test the second line 
of argument that farmers who had occupied a farm for many years felt more 
secure about the future and hence invested more. We might expect to see a 
correlation between the length of occupancy and investment if the second 
argument were true. 
16 
Chapter 3 
The Royal Commission 1882 
Cormac 6 Gnida refers to "The replies to the questionnaire prepared by the 
Assistant Commissioner Little for the Royal Commission of 1880-1882.· in his 
article Agricultural Decline 1860-191430 • He writes that by implication and 
suggestion the evidence supports his view that tenancy arrangements did not 
adversely affect agricultural techniques . I propose to use Commissioner Little's 
report, relying on more quantitative econometric techniques. 
The title of the commission was the "Royal Commission on the Depressed State 
of the Agricultural Interest". The commission was called for in July 1879 by 
Mr H. Chaplin the owner of some 23,000 acres in Lincolnshire and 
agriculture' s spokesman in the House of Commons. The assistant 
commissioners set about finding the causes of the depressed state by looking for 
falling profits, rising costs and reduced output. 31 In their search for the causes 
of the depression the assistants interviewed numerous farmers and effectively 
invited them to air their complaints. 
"much of their interrogation consisted in the kind of amicable discussion, 
with hearsay evidence prominent, of the weather, markets, taxes, yields, 
diseases and so on that is indulged in at all times among farmers, agents, 
merchants and others of the agricultural community when all participants 
share a common interest and expertise . "32 
306 Gnida, 'Agricultural Decline, 1860-1914', pI87 
3IT.W. F1etcher, 'Lancashire Livestock Farming During the Depression', in 
P.J. Perry, (ed), 'British Agriculture 1875-1914', p44 
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Having discussed almost every type of agricultural complaint the commission 
concluded that the immediate problem was the recent bad weather and that the 
new competition from abroad meant that prices no longer rose when output fell 
in a bad harvest. Among the complaints discussed was tenant right and the 
effects of security on investment. Assistant Commissioner William Little 
investigated the problem by asking a number of farmers to complete his 
questionnaire. 
The replies to Mr Little's questionnaire are an invaluable source of economic 
data. One hundred and thirty-five farms responded to the questionnaire giving 
it a good sample size. The respondents are all from the southern counties of 
England stretching from Cornwall to Kent. Each farm was asked six questions 
that related to tenancy and agricultural investment. The farmers responded 
whether: Tenure was by lease or from year to year, Length of occupation, 
Covenants as to cropping and sale of produce, Allowances for tenant right, 
Artificial manures used, Feeding stuffs purchased. The farm size was recorded 
along with its county and district. Listed below is a transcript of the questions. 
2. Upon what tenure do you own your farm-
a) Upon lease? 
b) Under yearly agreement? 
Yearly or otherwise? 
With what length of notice to quit? 
3. For how long has the farm been in the occupation of yourself or any 
member of your family? 
4. What are the conditions and covenants upon which the farm is held 
in reference to-
a) Cropping. 
18 
b) The sale of produce (including hay , straw and roots). 
23. What are your allowances for tenant right on quitting? 
14. What quantity of artificial manures do you consume per annum on 
your farm? 
15. What quantity of feeding stuffs? 
The data was all contained within the report. The answers needed to be 
quantified if the data was to be used in an econometric model. The existence 
of a lease was represented by a I or 0 for a dummy variable. The duration 
of the lease was recorded in years. The total length of notice was used in the 
case of year to year agreements. The length of family occupation on the farm 
was recorded in years. A dummy variable called OFFLAND showed whether 
the tenant was entitled to sell hay and roots off the farm. Ones and noughts 
were used to indicate whether the tenant felt he had allowances for tenant right 
on quitting. The quantities of manures and feedstuffs were quantified. It was 
thought best to use the cost of these goods instead of tons of nitrogen or 
calorific value of feed. Some farmers gave the value and others gave the 
quantity of guano, superphosphate, oilseed cake et cetera. The variety of 
responses were all encoded onto a spreadsheet using the numerous price and 
conversion factors fully described in the appendix. A number of farms had to 
be excluded because they had a mixed lease or had not correctly completed the 
questionnaire. These farms are listed in the appendix along with the reason for 
exclusion. Having dropped 24 observations this left a clean data set of III 
farms. 
19 
Chapter 4 
The Royal Commission - Analysis 
I developed a model which I could test using Ordinary Least Squares estimation 
to test the different theories about agricultural investment. The intention was 
to find what factors, if any, affected investment. 
Different size farms would obviously require different amounts of feed and 
fertiliser. For this reason the model used investment per acre as the dependant 
variable. I was interested in whether different factors affected the consumption 
of feed and fertiliser. One might expect the length of lease to be more 
important when purchasing fertiliser because its effects last longer than the feed 
and subsequent manure. For this reason three models were set up which I have 
numbered I, 2 and 3. Model I uses the sum of expenditure on feed and 
fertiliser as a proxy for tenant's investment. This is divided by the number of 
acres on the farm to give the variable UNITINV, (investment per acre) . Model 
2 has UNITFEED, (feed per acre) as the dependant variable and Model 3 uses 
UNITFERT, (fertiliser per acre). 
Each of the three models uses the same explanatory variables. Firstly, there 
is a constant term, CONST. Then there is the variable ACRES which is the 
farm size. This is to determine whether bigger farms invested more or less per 
acre than smaller farms . Next is a dummy variable called ALLOW. This is 
either a 1 or 0 depending on whether the farmer thought that he had allowances 
for tenant-right on quitting. A value of one indicates that he did have 
allowances . The next variable, LEASE, has a value of I for a lease holding 
farmer or 0 if the farmer has an agreement from year to year. Having a lease 
does not preclude a farmer from having an allowance for tenant-right. The 
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next variable DURAT is the duration of the farmer's contract. Either this is 
the length of the lease or, in the case of yearly agreements, this is the length 
of notice to quit (typically six months or a year) . OCCUP is the variable for 
the length of family occupation on the farm . If 6 Gnida's second argument is 
right we would expect to see a positive coefficient for this variable, implying 
a long occupation leads to security about the future . 
The variable OFFLAND is a dummy variable that indicates whether the farmer 
was entitled to sell off the land. Traditionally, the landlord required the tenant 
to plough root crops back into the soil or feed them with the hay to the farm 
animals . The hay would be converted into manure and used, along with the 
roots and straw, to enrich the soil. Selling root crops, hay and straw was 
selling· off the land" and if this was done persistently it would exhaust the soil 
of all its nutrients. Persistent selling off land would be sustainable if the lost 
nutrients were replaced with extra feed or fertiliser. This was the view of the 
historian J.T. Coppock. He believed that the purpose of covenants was to 
protect the land, farmers were normally entitled to sell crops, hay and straw 
when sufficient dung was brought back to replace the lost manurial value.33 
If the coefficient on the variable OFFLAND turned out to be positive and 
significant this would indicate that these farmers were selling off land and 
replacing the lost nutrients with purchased inputs . Some of the farmers in Mr 
Little's report said that they were not entitled to sell off land but did so without 
the knowledge of their landlord. They were given a I in the OFFLAND 
variable as if they were entitled to do so. 
33Coppock, 'Agricultural Changes in the Chilterns 1875-1900', p60 
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Finally, there is the problem of regional variation. The incidence of lease 
holding was fairly evenly distributed across the sample, which was fortunate . 
However, it was found that, when running regressions with dummy variables 
for each county, there were regional variations that were statistically 
significant. The counties with higher investment per acre tended to be Kent 
and Surrey; counties one would associate with market gardening. By using 
data from the Agricultural returns34 I was able to assemble data on the regional 
distribution of: orchards, market gardens, nurseries, woods and cattle. This 
data was expressed as a percentage of total acreage under cultivation, (and 
cattle per acre) , and used in place of county dummies . I found that the variable 
GARDEN was highly significant but the other variables were not and were 
subsequently dropped from the model. This completes the model: 
Investment per acre = a(CONS1)+,sI(ACRES)+,siALLOW)+,s3(LEASE)+,siDURAl) 
+,ss(OCCUP)+,s6(OFFLAND )+,s,(GARDEN) 
34Agriculturai Returns, P.P. (1882), LXXIV, p50 and p20-32 
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Results 
Table 1 - MODEL 1 
Dependent variable is UNITINV 
III observations used for estimation from 1 to III 
Regressor Coefficient Standard T-Ratio 
Error 
CONST 0.9704 0.2236 4.34 ***** 
ACRES -0.0003 0.0002 -1.67 ** 
ALLOW 0.3692 0.1514 2.44 **** 
LEASE 0.7135 0.2962 2.41 **** 
DURAT -0.0372 0.0196 -1.90 ** 
OCCUP -0.0014 0.0020 -0.71 
OFFLAND -0.3134 0.1531 -2.05 *** 
GARDEN 0.9109 0.2965 3.07 ***** 
R-Squared 0.2175 
S.E . of 0.7530 
Regression 
Note: * significant at 0.1 level, ** at 0.05 level, *** at 0.025, **** at 0.01 
and ***** at 0.005 
All the coefficients are significantly different from zero at atleast the 5% level 
apart from OCCUP which is not significant at even the 10% level. The results 
imply that there is a constant investment of 97 pence per acre which falls by 
0.03 pence for every extra acre of land, i.e. bigger farms spend fractionally 
less per acre; returns to scale were not important in determining investment. 
Having an allowance for tenant-right increases investment by approximately 37 
pence per acre, while having a lease increases investment by 71 pence per acre. 
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However, longer leases resulted in lower investment; 3.7 pence per acre per 
year of the lease. 
The coefficient on OFFLAND was significantly less than zero at the 2.5 % level 
which implies that farmers who were entitled to sell off land spent less per acre 
on feed and fertiliser than other farmers . Either, they farmed their land less 
intensively or they were exhausting the soil of its nutrients. This second 
scenario is not sustainable, either the farmer will have to leave and move to 
another farm or he will end up farming poor soil with low annual yields. It is 
possible that these farmers began exhausting the soil for a quick return and 
ended up farming poor quality land which gave low income and hence 
insufficient retained earnings to break out into higher intensity farming. 
Further research would be necessary to determine whether this was the case. 
Finally, the coefficient on GARDEN was positive and highly significant. 
Whilst it appears that a high concentration of market gardening raises 
investment it will become apparent from the results for models 2 and 3 that this 
relationship was slightly more complicated. Most importantly, the results give 
very strong evidence for the hypothesis that tenancy arrangements affected 
agricultural investment. 6 Gnida said that having an allowance was sufficient 
to encourage tenant farmers to invest. The results show that having an 
allowance did increase investment by approximately 40 pence per acre. 
However, having a lease could increase investment by a further 70 pence. 
Furthermore, the results seem to suggest that short lease holders without an 
allowance invested more than non-lease holders with an allowance; a difference 
of 30 pence per acre. 
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To test whether the coefficient on ALLOW is significantly different to the 
coefficient on LEASE we must compare Model I against a restricted version -
Investment per acre = a(CONST)+.81(ACRES)+.8s(ALLOW+LEASE)+ 
.BiDURA T) + .8l0CCUP) + .86(OFFLAND) + .87(GARDEN) 
The restriction on Model 1 is that the coefficients on LEASE and ALLOW are 
the same and equal to .8s. The regression gave the following results. 
Table 2 - MODEL 1 Restricted 
Dependent variable is UNITINV 
111 observations used for estimation from 1 to 111 
Regressor Coefficient Standard T-Ratio 
Error 
CONST 0.9203 0.2196 4.19 ***** 
ACRES -0.0003 0.0002 -1.51 * 
ALLOW + LEASE 0.4178 0. 1455 2.87 ***** 
DURAT -0.0193 0.0119 -1.62 * 
OCCUP -0.0010 0.0020 -0.52 
OFFLAND -0.3052 0.1532 -1.99 *** 
GARDEN 0.9237 0.2967 3.11 ***** 
R-Squared 0.2075 
S.E. of Regression 0.7541 
Note: * significant at 0.1 level, ** at 0.05 level, *** at 0.025, **** at 0.01 
and ***** at 0.005 
The test is to see whether the unrestricted model is significantly better than the 
restricted model. This is done by comparing the residual sum of squares. 
2S 
Ho: f32=f33 
HI: f3~3 
RSSr-RSSu / Cl - F(q, n-k) 59.1388-58.3946/1 
RSSu / (n-k) 58.3946 / (111-8) 
FI,60,0.05 
FI ,120,0.05 
= 4.00 
= 3.92 
= 1.312 
Therefore the null hypothesis is not rejected . This means that the improvement 
in the residual sum of squares is no more than might be expected by chance and 
the coefficients on LEASE and ALLOW are not significantly different from one 
another. To determine which has the greatest influence on investment one 
would need a larger data set that would yield lower standard errors . 
95 % Confidence Intervals 
ALLOW 
LEASE 
0.3692 +/- (0.1514*1.960)0.07 < f3 < 0.67 
0.7135 +/- (0.2962*1.960)0.13 < f3 < 1.29 
Added to this is the complication that the coefficient on DURA T is negative 
and significant at the 5 % level. This implies that holders of long leases 
invested less per acre and were therefore less intensive farmers. If the point 
estimates of the coefficients are completely accurate than the benefits of having 
a lease would be completely diminished if the contract duration was 20 years. 
This unexpected result is explained by the results from models 2 and 3. 
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Figure 1. 
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Table 3 - MODEL 2 
Dependent variable is UNITFEED 
III observations used for estimation from 1 to III 
Regressor Coefficient Standard T-Ratio 
Error 
CONST 0.5776 0.2094 2.76 ***** 
ACRES -0.0001 0.0002 -0.69 
ALLOW 0.3453 0.1418 2.44 **** 
LEASE 0.8183 0.2774 2.95 ***** 
DURAT -0.0510 0.0184 -2.77 ***** 
OCCUP -0.0016 0.0019 -0.83 
OFFLAND -0.2939 0.1435 -2.05 *** 
GARDEN 0.8064 0.2777 2.90 ***** 
R-Squared 0.1980 
S.E. of Regression 0.7053 
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Table 4 - MODEL 3 
Dependent variable is UNITFERT 
I II observations used for estimation from 1 to III 
Regressor Coefficient Standard T-Ratio 
Error 
CONST 0.3929 0.0918 4.28 ***** 
ACRES -0.0002 0.0001 -2.49 **** 
ALLOW 0.0239 0.0622 0.38 
LEASE -0.1048 0.1216 -0.86 
DURAT 0.0138 0.0081 1.71 ** 
OCCUP 0.0001 0.0008 0.16 
OFFLAND -0.0195 0.0629 -0.31 
GARDEN 0.1045 0.1217 0.86 
R-Squared 0.1314 
S.E. of Regression 0.3092 
Note: * significant at 0.1 level , ** at 0.05 level, *** at 0.025 , **** at 0.01 
and ***** at 0.005 
In Model 2 the lease increases expenditure on feed by 81 pence per acre and 
then reduces it by 5 pence for every year of duration. Both of these 
coefficients are highly significant. This implies that long lease holders spent 
less on feed than other lease holders . This is consistent with the results for 
Model 3. In Model 3 only three of the coefficients were significantly different 
from zero: CONST, ACRES and DURA T. In this case the holder of a 20 year 
lease invests 28 pence per acre more than the farmer with a yearly agreement. 
The results from models 2 and 3 show that holders of longer leases spend more 
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on fertiliser and less on feed . This suggests that having a long lease gives the 
tenant the security required to invest in fertiliser for his land. Because the 
effects of the fertiliser last so long, just having a short lease was not sufficient 
to encourage investment, hence the coefficient on LEASE is not significant. 
In a recent study of tenure on modern farm performance the following theory 
was put forward . 
"in circumstances where the tenants future occupancy is uncertain, he will be 
inclined to provide more factors to enterprises with short production periods 
and fewer to those requiring longer to mature, even though the latter might 
yield better returns in the long run. "35 
"tenant investment tends in the direction of resources which can be transformed 
into product in one season and for which the return is relatively certain. 
Instead of investing in lime, fertiliser or seed for legume crops, he turns his 
investment in the direction of tractor fuel for more cash grain crops. The 
production of hogs is favoured above dairying . .. 36 
The results from models 2 and 3 suggest a similar situation in the nineteenth 
century. With his ability to safely invest in fertiliser the farmer with a long 
lease was able to concentrate on growing crops and move away from a mixed 
farm . For this reason he spends less on feed than the holders of short leases . 
If it is true that livestock required more annual expenditure than crop growing 
then we should not be surprised that long lease holders spent less in total than 
short lease holders .37 Also, if we assume that investment in fertiliser lasts five 
35R. Gasson and B. Hill, 'Farm Tenure and Performance' ,(1984), p16 
36lbid . 
37Feed accounts for some 80 % of production costs in poultry farming - T .W. 
Fletcher, 'Lancashire Livestock Farming During the Depression', p82 
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years and that investment in feed lasts two years, by comparing annual 
expenditures, total investment in fertiliser is understated. To summarise, 
having a lease increased investment in feedstuffs, unless the lease was long, in 
which case, this increased investment in fertiliser. 
In Model 2 the coefficient on the dummy variable ALLOW is significant at the 
1 % level. Allowance for tenant right did increase investment in feed. 
However, in Model 3 the coefficient is not significant, even at the 10% level. 
Tenant-right was not sufficient to encourage investment in fertiliser. From the 
results for UNITFEED it seems that having a lease was more effective than 
having an allowance for tenant-right; by 50 pence per acre. By running a 
regression on the restricted model that used the same coefficient for ALLOW 
and LEASE I was able to carry out another improvement in fit test. The F-
statistic was 2.82, not high enough to reject the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients were the same. 
95 % Confidence Intervals 
ALLOW 0.3453 +/- (0.1418*1.960)0.07 < {3 < 0.62 
LEASE 0.7135 +/- (0.2774*1.960)0.27 < {3 < 1.36 
Although we can not say that a lease was better than an allowance, it was still 
better to have a lease and allowance than only the allowance. Those farmers 
who had neither were in the worst situation. Therefore it is not true to say that 
the set of customary rules was sufficient to encourage investment. From Model 
3, we can see that having allowance did not encourage any investment in 
fertiliser. 
6 Gnida suggested that farmers were resident for so long that they should feel 
secure about their future . The results do not support this point of view. In 
none of the models was the coefficient on OCCUP significant. The highest T-
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statistic was -0.83 and even this had the wrong sign. I believe we can say with 
some certainty that length of occupation did not affect investment. 
Those farmers who sold off the land seem to have invested less in feed than all 
other farmers but not behaved any differently when it came to fertiliser. This 
might be because it was easier to strip the soil of its nutrients by growing crops 
and not keeping livestock. Alternatively, they might have been so 
impoverished by their earlier rape of the land that their retained profits were 
only sufficient to buy the minimum of fertiliser which had better returns than 
the same value of feed. Whatever the reason, more research would be needed 
to determine the true nature of the relationship and that is outside the scope of 
this paper. 
Earlier I discussed the seemingly strong relationship between concentration of 
market gardening and investment. With the benefit of the results for Models 
2 and 3 I believe we can shed more light on the matter. One might have 
thought that high concentrations of market gardening would require greater 
investment in fertiliser. We can see from the results in tables 3 and 4 that this 
was not the case. For example; when it came to feedstuffs Kent used 
approximately 60 pence per acre more than Wiltshire. However, the 
coefficient on GARDEN was not significant when it came to fertiliser. I 
believe that this is because GARDEN is acting as a proxy variable for 
'proximity to major urban market' - namely London. Counties near major 
cities faced different demand for their produce and hence their investment 
behaviour was different. There are a number of reasons why investment was 
focused more on feed and not fertiliser . Farmers found that grazing land could 
be used more profitably if it was turned over to growing fruit, hops and market 
produce. Nevertheless, it may still have been worth keeping livestock, for 
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while urban incomes were rising so was their demand for fresh meat, eggs and 
milk. Instead of using land to grow hay and pasture for livestock it may have 
been more profitable to feed the animals with purchased feed. 38 Once eaten by 
the animal the feed would become fertiliser anyway; these farmers were already 
investing in fertiliser by buying it indirectly as feed . Like the off land farming, 
this is an area for more research but not an issue that concerns this paper. 
Finally, the coefficient on ACRES is of passing interest. The coefficient is not 
significant for UNITFEED but is highly significant for UNITFERT. The 
results show that larger farms invested fractionally less per acre than their 
smaller competitors. The difference is negligible - 0.02 pence per acre - but 
it may have been that some owners of large farms found it harder to raise the 
necessary capital for investment. Being a larger farm, the total investment 
would also have been larger and it may have been harder to borrow or 
accumulate such a large sum. This was not the case with feed and perhaps this 
because of the shorter pay-back period and hence lower risk. 
38Grassland farmers wishing to produce winter milk were increasingly 
dependant on purchased feed - Ibid . p82 
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Investment 
Criticisms 
The low values of R-squared might seem to be a problem. This is not the case, 
in fact it would be surprising if we could explain much more than 20 % of the 
variance in investment per acre. There are other factors that could affect a 
farmers choice of purchases . Most important would be what crops he was 
going to grow and in what quantity. Other factors could be: his expected sale 
price, the suitability of his land to different produce, his access to capital, his 
retained profits and his personal tastes . These omitted variables could lead to 
omitted variable bias. However, this bias would only be introduced if the 
omitted variables were correlated with any of the regressors . Some of the 
omitted variables would be endogenous such as, what crops to grow and his 
access to capital markets and so their omission is not important. The quality 
of his land is not likely to be correlated with any of the regressors and as 
discussed earlier GARDEN is probably only significant because of its 
correlation with access to urban markets. The lower R-squared statistic in no 
way invalidates the results and their standard errors . In fact a less suitable 
model may have a higher R-squared. 
a(CONST) +(J,(ACRES) + (Jz(ALLOW) + (J3(LEASE) + {JiDU RAT) 
+ (Js(OCCUP) + f16(OFFLAND) + f17(GARDEN) 
This model, which uses investment as the dependant variable, yields an R-
squared of 0.4 . This is because a large degree of the variance in investment 
is explained by the different farm size which is not the case in Models 1,2 and 
3 where the dependant variable is investment divided by farm size. A high R-
squared is not always a sign of success . 
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A fairer criticism would be of the regional distribution of the sample. It is 
possible, though perhaps unlikely, that tenancy only affects investment in 
Southern Counties. By using a sample that covered a larger proportion of the 
country it would be possible to determine the relationship between tenancy and 
investment for the whole country. Such a sample was unavailable and until a 
broader study is carried out we can only assume that the results for the 
Southern Counties are true for the rest of the country. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
The evidence for Thompson's idea of a Second Agricultural Revolution is his 
data for increased expenditure on fertiliser and feed . The data shows a huge 
rise in the sale of agricultural inputs and I think that he quite rightly sees this 
as evidence for a change in techniques. He makes the point that by the end of 
the nineteenth-century entire industries were dependent on agricultural demand 
for their products . Agricultural products used about a third of the UK's total 
output of sulphuric acid . 
" .. this transformation, financed and managed by tenant farmers, took place 
within an unregenerated institutional framework of landlord and tenant 
relations, before any statutory enactment of comp 
ulsory compensation ... which did not come until 1883" 
"In the face of the evidence of what actually happened to agriculture it 
seems idle to pretend that these legal and institutional arrangements 
discouraged enterprise by tenant farmers" 
"Institutional arrangements which were theoretically objectionable did in fact 
work in practice, and cases of hardship ... [exaggerated for political 
reasons] ... were of no economic importance. _39 
However, I believe he takes his evidence for rising consumption too far. From 
the evidence contained within Mr Little' s report, this clearly was not the case. 
Professor Thompson has seen rising investment and taken this as an indication 
of healthy institutional arrangements . What he fails to see is that under 
different institutional conditions investment may have risen faster. If this had 
3"rhompson, 'Second Agricultural Revolution' , p72 
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been the case then perhaps we would have seen higher levels of productivity 
at earlier dates . This would not have been of "no economic importance". 
6 Gnida also tries a similar form of argument. 
" .. there is no sign that the system materially hindered the development of 
fruit farming and market gardening at this time, though these involved 
considerable fixed outlays on the part of the tenant. ,,40 
He is saying that, because we see farmers making investments this is evidence 
for the smooth workings of landlord-tenant relationships . He fails to see is 
that, had institutional conditions been different then we may have seen 
investment in fruit farming take place at an earlier date and in larger amounts. 
The evidence from Mr Little's report has shown that the institutional 
arrangements were not satisfactory . Lease holders and holders of tenant right 
invested significantly more than those farmers without security of tenure. 
Furthermore, holders of long leases invested in larger quantities of fertiliser 
than other farmers , indicating their greater security. Lord Ernle believed that 
countries like Holland and Germany were consuming considerably more 
artificial fertiliser than Britain and that this was due to the falling acreage under 
arable cultivation"! Perhaps , if British farmers had had the greater security 
afforded to long lease holders then arable acreage would not have fallen and 
British farmers would have been more profitable. 
40 6 Gnida, 'Agricultural Decline 1860-1914' , pI87 
4! Lord Ernle, 'The Great Depression and Recovery', in P .J. Perry, (ed), 
'British Agriculture 1875-1914', p13 
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Appendix 
1. Regional Variation 
Acreage of: 
ORCHARD 1,888 1,502 16,861 1,956 2,080 2,890 4,809 26, 123 3,975 23, 104 
GARDEN 305 1,077 5,632 2,186 1,178 206 1,168 850 122 625 
NURSERY 160 176 673 1,328 485 108 S4 342 106 193 
WOODS 29,120 105,489 82,849 42,974 113,043 45,270 28,987 77,459 32,250 39,850 
~ OFCAITLE 35,476 67,377 73,409 45,495 100,352 86,989 166,742 233,409 76,602 210,6711 
TOTAL ACREAGE 1376,574 708,687 745,215 299,233 675,233 757,402 558,757 1,165,926 487,520 856,3171 
Percentage of total 
ORCHARD 0.50 0.21 2.26 0.65 0.31 0.38 0.86 2.24 0.82 2.70 
GARDEN 0.08 0.15 0.76 0.73 0.17 0.03 0.21 0.07 0.03 0.07 
NURSERY 0.04 0.02 0.09 0.44 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 
WOODS 7.73 14.89 11.12 14.36 16.74 5.98 5.19 6.64 6.62 4.65 
CAITLE PER ACRE 9.42 9.51 9.85 15.20 14.86 11.49 29.84 20.02 15.71 24.60 
Source: Parliamentary Papers LXXIV 1882 p50 and p20-32 
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2. Fertiliser Prices 
Where possible, the prices derived from the Appendix in F.M.L. Thompson, 'Second Agricultural 
Revolution' were used. The prices derived from Accounts and Papers were used as a check on the 
Thompson figures and to provide a price for Lime. 
Fertiliser prices from FML Thompoon - Second Agricultural Revolution (£ per ton) 
Period -1877-S1 
Price of general fertiliser 8.01 Table 5 p77 value of all fertilisers - Divided by - torn; of all fertilisers 
Price of guano 9.16 Table 3 p76 value of guano - Divided by - tons of guano net 
Price of superphosphate 8.00 Table 3 p76 value of superphosphate - Divided by - tons of superphosphate 
Price of bones 6.06 Table 3 p76 value of bones - Divided by - tons of bones 
Price of cake 8.11 Table 3 p76 value of oilseed cake - Divided by - tons of oil seed cake 
Price of maize 6 .00 Table 3 p76 value of maize - Divided by - tons of maize 
Fertiliser Prices 
Price of bones 5.87 
Price of guano 9.73 
Price of cake 7.98 
Source: B.P.P. LXXIV 1882 Pages 60 .{i I 
Table 8 - Quantities and values of manures imported into the UK -1 88 1 
Table 9 - Quantities and values of oil cake, ... clover seeds imported into the UK -1881 
Fertiliser Prices 
Price of booes 5.87 
Price of guano 9.73 
Phosphate of Lime and Rock 3.07 
Price of cake 7.98 
Source: B.P.P. LXXIX 1890 Pages 142-143 
Table XLVIl1 - Quantities and values of oil cake, ... clover seeds imported into the UK -1881 
Table XLIX - Quantities and values of manures iritported into the UK -1 881 /1882 
Lime 
300 hogsheads of lime= 16,200 gallons 
Assume same density as water 
@ £3 perton 
1000 bushels = 8000 gallons 
@ L3 Jl"f ton 
72 .5 ton 
£223 
35.8 ton 
£11 0 
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Tahle 4 p76 
Table 2 p75 
Table 2 p75 
Table 2 p75 
Table I p74 
Table I p74 
3. Corn Prices 
There are many sources for the price of corn per quarter or bushel. The problem is trying to 
convert the volume of grain t o mass. Some of the fanners stated their consumption in tons and 
hundredweights, others used bushels and quarters. The density of grain came from Mitchell's 
Abstract of Historical Statisti cs, the average density was used in conjunction with the prices for 
1881. 
Price per Imperial quarte 
Wheat Barley 
1880 2.22 1.65 
1881 2.27 1.60 
1882 2.25 1.56 
Mitchell - Abstract of Histori 
Statistics P489 
Price per Bushel (£) 
Wheat Barley 
1880 0.28 0.21 
1881 0,28 0.20 
1882 0.28 0.19 
r (£) 
Oats 
1.15 
1.09 
1.09 
ca! 
Oats 
0.14 
0.14 
0.14 
Price per long ton (£) 
Wheat 
1880 10.03 
1881 10.26 
1882 10.20 
Barley 
8.59 
8.29 
8.10 
Oats 
8.07 
7.61 
7.63 
Density of corn crops (bushels per ton) 1910-39 
Wheat Barley Oats 
High 37.32 42.88 59.01 
Low 35.29 40.50 52.59 
Average 36.21 41.56 55.95 
Mitchell - Abstract of Historical 
Statistics P86 
Weight of bushel (lbs) 
Wheat Barley 
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High 
Low 
Average 
60.02 52.24 
63.47 55.31 
61.86 53 .90 
Oats 
37.96 
42.59 
40.04 
4. Other Prices and Conversion Factors 
Maize (assume 50lbs per bushel) 
8 quarters=64 bushels=3200lbs=1.4 tons 
Maize @ £6 per ton 
Approx. value of 8qtrs 
175 bushels=8750Ibs=3 .9 tons 
Approx. value of 175 bushels 
25 quarters of maize 
£8 
£23 
£26 
Source for maize: F.M.L. Thompson 'Second Agricultural Revolution' 
A ·cultural Returns - E rt rices 
Malt price per quarter in 1884 2.18 
20 uarters of malt £44 
Source: B.P.P. LXXIX 1890 Page 146-7 
I cwt = 112 pounds 
I ton=2240 pounds 
1 C\\1=O.05 tons 
1 qtr=8 bushels 
I bushel=8 gallons 
1 cwt= 1 hundredweight= 112 Ibs 
I hogshead=54 gallons 
Source: Collins English Dictionary, Third Edition 
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5. The Data Set 
Order # Farm # ACRES LEASE DURAT OCCUP OFFLAND ALLOW FERT FEED 
1 1 720 1 14.0 7 1 0 80 0 
2 2 645 0 0.5 40 1 0 168 300 
3 3 426 1 12.0 75 0 0 360 417 
4 4 700 0 1.0 36 0 1 30 884 
5 6 488 1 20.0 J3 0 I 40 0 
6 8 420 0 0.5 80 0 1 0 150 
7 9 1150 1 5.0 300 1 1 230 0 
8 10 900 I 4.0 90 0 0 185 450 
9 11 560 I 1.0 46 0 0 0 500 
10 12 500 I 8.0 47 I 0 0 550 
11 13 670 1 12.U 8 0 0 0 I,OU5 
12 14 515 0 0.5 70 0 0 0 1,000 
14 81 500 0 4.5 41 1 1 96 550 
15 82 800 1 14.0 41 1 1 100 500 
16 83 660 0 2.0 48 1 0 lOO 200 
17 83.5 1300 1 2.0 48 I 0 0 1,177 
18 85 1200 1 2.0 65 I 0 200 2,200 
19 85.5 850 1 2.0 65 I I 289 870 
20 86 1600 1 19.0 14 1 1 1,500 1,000 
21 87 1100 1 14.0 19 I I 200 450 
22 88 !lOO I 14 .0 41 I () 500 200 
23 89 900 0 2.0 14 1 0 120 100 
24 90 730 1 8.5 22 0 0 641 649 
25 91 475 0 0.5 23 I 0 lOO lOO 
26 92 520 I 7.0 33 I 0 9 400 
27 94 800 I 14.0 13 1 0 145 400 
28 95 190 0 0.5 22 1 1 86 294 
29 97 800 1 14.0 41 1 0 400 800 
30 98 330 1 14.0 25 1 I 300 300 
31 101 780 0 1.0 30 0 I 800 1,900 
32 102 188 0 1.0 22 0 0 60 24 
33 103 500 0 1.0 12 0 1 61 90 
34 104 400 1 14.0 64 1 1 200 500 
35 105 500 1 14.0 !l3 1 0 0 195 
36 106 360 0 1.0 34 1 1 447 523 
37 107 550 1 14.0 60 1 0 280 300 
39 109 380 1 21.0 8 1 0 441 0 
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The Data Set Continued 
Order # Farm # ACRES LEASE DURAT OCCUP OFFLAND ALLOW FERT FEED 
40 110 460 1 21.0 14 1 0 ISO 478 
41 111 290 0 1.0 28 1 0 344 475 
42 112 420 I 14.0 21 1 1 100 718 
·B 113 610 0 1.0 63 1 1 0 371 
44 122 330 1 14.0 6 I 1 117 162 
45 123 500 I 17.5 9 I I 100 162 
46 124 350 0 2.0 26 0 1 0 0 
~7 125 220 I 14.0 15 0 1 40 600 
49 126 250 I 14.0 9 0 I 36 1,539 
50 129 330 I 14.0 55 I 0 52 105 
52 132 944 I 14.0 41 1 I 100 850 
53 134 900 0 0.5 58 1 1 100 200 
54 136 1180 1 14.0 28 I I 150 1,100 
55 138 350 0 0.5 53 1 I ISO 150 
56 140 177 1 14.0 60 1 1 83 150 
57 141 1000 1 14.0 13 I 0 200 0 
58 1~2 500 0 2.0 23 1 I 125 0 
59 142.5 ISO I 8.0 23 I 0 46 133 
60 143 320 0 1.0 IS 0 I lIS 176 
61 144 400 I 14.0 27 I I ISO 600 
63 147 1050 0 2.0 30 0 0 100 930 
64 148 1750 0 1.0 30 1 0 303 283 
66 ISO 550 0 1.0 12 0 0 24 300 
68 153 840 1 17.0 63 I 1 163 776 
69 154 630 0 1.0 40 0 I 68 200 
70 157 1600 0 2.0 41 0 I 450 500 
71 158 1200 I 16.0 13 I 1 280 420 
n 159 1900 I 21.0 18 0 0 180 500 
73 163 no 0 1.0 41 0 0 35 0 
74 164 1000 I 14.0 27 0 0 140 243 
75 165 700 0 0.5 SO 0 I 80 943 
76 16 600 I 21.0 46 I 0 300 0 
78 19 220 I 14.0 8 0 0 88 0 
82 23 200 I 14.0 19 I 0 100 81 
84 25 270 I 14.0 29 0 0 215 12 
86 27 518 I 21.0 29 0 0 110 0 
88 30 253 0 0.5 100 0 0 200 110 
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The Data Set Continued 
Order # Farm # ACRES LEASE DURAT OCCUP OFFLAND ALLOW FERT 
89 31 354 1 14.0 25 1 0 
90 32 173 1 21.0 23 0 1 
91 33 530 1 14.0 20 0 0 
92 34 560 0 1.0 15 0 1 
94 36 300 1 21.0 10 0 0 
95 37 385 1 14.0 40 0 0 
96 39 320 0 1.0 28 0 1 
98 41 105 1 21.0 8 1 0 
99 42 326 1 14.0 80 1 0 
lOO 43 236 0 1.0 60 0 1 
101 46 70 0 1.0 200 1 1 
103 50 247 1 14.0 16 1 1 
105 53 200 0 1.0 70 0 1 
106 55 309 1 14.0 8 0 1 
109 59 600 1 14.0 70 0 0 
111 61 288 1 12.0 36 0 1 
112 62 212 0 0.5 21 1 0 
113 66 222 0 0.5 13 0 0 
)]4 67 225 I 21.0 54 0 0 
115 68 300 I 21.0 30 0 0 
116 69 1000 I 21.0 30 0 0 
118 71 360 0 1.0 16 0 1 
1I9 72 800 0 1.0 12 1 1 
120 73 350 0 1.0 36 1 1 
121 74 600 0 2.0 150 I I 
122 75 1250 0 0.5 35 I 1 
123 76 1I00 0 0.5 60 0 I 
124 77 1600 1 8.0 54 0 0 
125 78 321 1 14.0 17 I 0 
126 79 503 0 0.5 lOO I 1 
127 114 298 0 1.0 21 1 1 
128 115 421 0 0.5 51 0 0 
130 117 360 1 10.0 41 0 0 
131 )]8 469 0 1.0 60 0 0 
132 119 441 0 1.0 16 0 ) 
133 1I9.5 325 I 20.0 30 0 1 
135 121 500 0 0.5 70 I I 
Source: B.P.P. (1882), XVI, The Report of Assistant Commissioner Little, Appendix E 
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220 
184 
450 
650 
160 
320 
100 
40 
150 
104 
32 
314 
130 
130 
160 
300 
120 
64 
200 
190 
195 
220 
250 
50 
320 
300 
280 
248 
50 
100 
71 
170 
30 
66 
60 
25 
19 
FEED 
0 
36 
100 
270 
0 
99 
50 
30 
150 
73 
4-l 
162 
200 
165 
178 
200 
120 
32 
89 
300 
470 
130 
660 
50 
446 
500 
354 
506 
150 
147 
40 
650 
750 
300 
500 
395 
450 
6. Farms Excluded From the Data 
Nwnber Commission Reason for Exclusion 
Nwnber 
13 15 Missing answer to Question 15 
38 108 Missing answers to Questions 14,15 
48 127 Size of farm missing 
51 l31 Missing answer to Question 14 
62 146 Part lease, part yearly agreement 
65 149 Missing answers to Questions 14,15 
67 152 Missing allowance and offiand 
79 20 Part lease, part yearly agreement 
80 21 Quantity of feedstuffs unknown 
81 22 Part lease, part yearly agreement 
83 24 Part lease, part yearly agreement 
85 26 Part lease, part yearly agreement 
87 28 Quantity of feedstuffs unknown 
93 35 Unknown value of feed 
97 40 Unspecified feedstufTs 
102 49 Unspecified feedstufTs 
107 56 Missing answers to Questions 23,14 
108 57 Unspecified feedstufTs 
110 60 Missing answers to Questions 3,4,15 
117 70 Part lease, part under agricultural holdings act 
129 116 Missing answers to Questions 14,15 
134 120 Unspecified feedstufTs 
104 52 Oats grown on the farm 
77 17 Unspecified feedstuffs 
Total of24 excluded 
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